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port in central and eastern Angola. The
spite of deploring the war in Angola,
own officers to join the Cuban forces
MPLA, meanwhile, was by mid-Octo-
Pretoria’s intervention had made out-
from Congo. These men started arriv-
ber entirely dependent on its support in
side support for the MPLA necessary.
ing in Luanda in the evening of Novem-
the western Luanda-Mbundu regions
He hoped that many African countries
ber 12.46
and in the cities. It controlled less than
now would aid Neto’s movement. Still,
The ensuing two weeks saw the
one-fourth of the country, and was los-
he warned against a too open Soviet
rapid advance toward Luanda of the
ing ground, in spite of Cuban reinforce-
support for the MPLA, and hoped that
UNITA army led by about 6.000 regu-
ments.40
Moscow would channel the bulk of its
lar South African troops. By late No-
The foreign alliance policies of the
aid through African governments. The
vember, these forces had reconquered
MPLA, and thereby its possibilities for
Soviet ambassador, untruthfully, re-
all the territory which Savimbi had lost
winning the struggle for power in
sponded that such would be the case.43
to the MPLA over the preceding
Angola, were saved by Pretoria’s Oc-
The Soviet military preparations
months. They had occupied every ma-
tober decision to launch an invasion.
for the airlift of Cuban troops to Angola
jor port south of the capital except Porto
Moscow knew of the South African
intensified in early November. The
Amboim, taken control of the Benguela
plans in advance of their implementa-
CPSU secretariat met on November 5
railway, and were attempting to set up
tion in mid-October, and the Kremlin
and decided to send Soviet naval units
their own civilian administration in
leadership discussed how to respond.
to areas off the Angolan coast. In
Huambo. Both the Soviets and the Cu-
The CPSU CC International Depart-
Brazzaville, in a striking reversal of
bans concluded that if the MPLA re-
ment considered the new stage of the
roles within less than two months, the
gime was to survive, the Cuban forces
anti-MPLA operations in Angola a joint
Soviet ambassador now exhorted his
would have to attack in the south as
U.S.-South African effort, and believed
Cuban colleague to “intensify”
soon as possible.47
the Soviet Union had to come to the aid
Havana’s preparations for combat in
After the creation of the MPLA
of its ally. In the third week of Octo-
Angola. “But a Cuban artillery regi-
regime the Politburo authorized the
ber, Moscow decided to start assisting
ment is already fighting in Luanda,” the
Soviet General Staff to take direct con-
the Cuban operation in Angola imme-
Cuban ambassador responded, some-
trol of the trans-Atlantic deployment of
diately after the MPLA had made its
what incredulously.44
additional Cuban troops, as well as the
declaration of independence on Novem-
Agostinho Neto declared the inde-
supplying of these troops with advanced
ber 11. The Soviet aim was to infuse
pendence of the People’s Republic of
military hardware. The massive opera-
enough Cuban troops and Soviet advis-
Angola on November 11, just as the
tion—the first Soviet effort of its kind—
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 27
transported more than 12,000 soldiers
instance in the case of Zambia, where
that disaster had struck again and again
by sea and air from Cuba to Africa be-
President Kenneth Kaunda switched
because of the Vietnamese leaders’ in-
tween late October 1975 and mid-Janu-
over to the MPLA’s side after substan-
ability to follow Moscow’s advice).54
ary 1976. In the same period it also
tial Soviet pressure.51
The Soviet cadres in Angola were,
provided FAPLA and the Cubans with
In terms of control of the central
by 1976, very satisfied with the way
hundreds of tons of heavy arms, as well
regions, the Angolan war was over by
both Angolans and Cubans had re-
as T-34 and T-54 tanks, SAM-7s, anti-
early March 1976. The capital of the
spected Moscow’s political primacy
tank missiles, and a number of MiG-21
anti-MPLA forces, Huambo, fell to
during the war. According to the em-
fighter planes.48
FAPLA forces on February 11. Holden
bassy, Neto realized his dependence on
It is still not possible to chart in any
Roberto had already in January returned
Soviet assistance and, equally impor-
detail the logistics of the Soviet opera-
to exile in Zaire and the FNLA had
tant, that it was Moscow, not Havana,
tion. What we do know is that the gov-
given up its military activities. Jonas
who made the final decisions. Even
ernments of several African countries
Savimbi had returned to the bush areas
though the embassy still did not trust
agreed to assist with the enterprise.
of southeastern Angola with about
Neto fully, they admitted that he had
Congo was the main staging ground for
2.000 guerillas and their U.S. and South
performed to their liking during these
personnel and arms arriving from Cuba
African advisers, and although he was
battles. In the spring of 1976 he con-
and the Soviet Union (although in some
to fight his way back to international
tinued to press for more Soviet military
cases An-22 transport planes flew di-
prominence by the early 1980s, in 1976
instructors, an attitude which the charge
rectly from the southern USSR or from
Savimbi himself realized that he could
d’affaires in Luanda, G.A. Zverev, held
Cuba). Algeria, Guinea, Mali, and Tan-
not effectively challenge FAPLA and
up as a sign of the Angolan president’s
zania cooperated with the efforts in dif-
the Cubans.52
dedication to the new alliance, even if
ferent ways, even if the Soviets on some
In the spring of 1976 the Soviet
Neto had not yet consented to request
occasions had to push hard to get their
leaders felt—with a high degree of cer-
permanent Soviet military bases.55
cooperation. Moscow also had to push
tainty and self-congratulation—that
As to the Cubans, the Soviet rep-
some of its East European allies to rush
they had won the Angolan war. The
resentatives often expressed a certain
to the defense of “African liberation and
Kremlin was impressed that the logis-
degree of surprise to Moscow at how
global anti-imperialism” by supporting
tics of the operation had worked so well:
harmonious were relations with the
the MPLA.49
over 7,000 kilometers from Moscow the
small Caribbean ally. The Soviet-Cu-
By the end of November the Cu-
Soviet Union had conducted a cam-
ban “close coordination in Angola dur-
bans had stopped the South African-led
paign in support of its allies against the
ing the war has had very positive re-
advance on Luanda, and in two battles
power of the United States and its strong
sults,” Zverev told his superiors in
south of the Cuanza river in December
regional supporters, and come out on
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